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In Recent Decisions, U.S. Supreme Court Narrows Miranda and Reviews the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 2006
Burton A. Rose, Esq.
The U.S. Supreme Court has decided the case of BERGHUIS, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. THOMPKINS, No. 08–1470, reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 547 F. 3d 572. JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court (5-4) in which Justices ROBERTS, SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO joined. Justice SOTOMAYOR filed a strong dissenting opinion, in which Justices STEVENS, GINSBURG, and BREYER joined.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging a Michigan conviction for first-degree murder, had ruled that a statement by the accused had been elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Michigan officers had interrogated the defendant about a fatal shooting. At no point did Thompkins say that he wanted to remain silent, that he did not want to talk with the police, or that he wanted an attorney. He was largely silent during the 3-hour interrogation, but near the end, he answered “yes” when asked if he prayed to God to forgive him for the shooting.
The Court held that Thompkins’ silence during the interrogation did not invoke his right to remain silent as a suspect’s Miranda right to counsel must be invoked “unambiguously”. The accused’s uncoerced statement established an implied waiver. Thompkins had waived his right to remain silent after receiving the Miranda warnings. After giving a Miranda warning, police may interrogate a suspect who has neither invoked nor waived Miranda rights. Thus, the police were not required to obtain a waiver of Thompkins’ Miranda rights before interrogating him.
"In sum, a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police. Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent and stop the questioning. Understanding his rights in full, he waived his right to remain silent by making a voluntary statement to the police. The police, moreover, were not required to obtain a waiver of Thompkins’s right to remain silent before interrogating him."
In another case, CARR v. UNITED STATES, No. 08–1301 (6/1/10), on certiorari review from the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the 7th Circuit, 551 F. 3d 578, the US Supreme Court reversed that court and ruled (6-3) that SORNA, 18 U. S. C. §2250(a), the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 2006, which makes it a federal crime for any person who is required to register under SORNA, and who travels in interstate or foreign commerce, to knowingly fail to register or update a registration, could not apply to this defendant’s travel to Indiana before SORNA’s effective date, as the statute then runs afoul of the Constitution’s prohibition on ex post facto laws. The statute will impose liability only where a person, after becoming subject to SORNA’s registration requirements, travels across state lines and then fails to register. The Court concluded that Congress did not intend for preenactment conduct to satisfy the statute.
Note that Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices ROBERTS, STEVENS, KENNEDY, and BREYER joined, and in which Justice SCALIA joined in part. Justice ALITO filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices THOMAS and GINSBURG joined.
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